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Abstract
Attempts to derive the Born rule, either in the Many Worlds or Copenhagen interpretation, are unsatisfactory for systems with only a finite
number of degrees of freedom. In the case of Many Worlds this is a serious problem, since its goal is to account for apparent collapse phenomena,
including the Born rule for probabilities, assuming only unitary evolution of the wavefunction. For finite number of degrees of freedom, observers
on the vast majority of branches would not deduce the Born rule. However, discreteness of the quantum state space, even if extremely tiny, may
restore the validity of the usual arguments.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction: the problem with probability
Quantum mechanics exhibits an odd dichotomy in the time
evolution of states. A quantum state undergoes deterministic,
unitary evolution until a measurement causes probabilistic, non-
unitary collapse. While many physicists do not feel that there is
anything wrong with this standard Copenhagen picture, it seems
less than economical to postulate two fundamental processes—
unitary evolution and non-unitary measurement—if somehow
one could suffice. Everett [1] proposed that unitary time evolu-
tion of a closed system is sufficient to account for the appear-
ance of measurement collapse to observers inside the system
(see also Hartle [2] and DeWitt and Graham [3]), in what has
now become known as the many worlds (MW) formulation of
quantum mechanics.
The MW interpretation is regarded as extravagant, and hence
implausible, by many (including at least one of the authors), be-
cause of the huge multiplicity of branches of the wavefunction,
each of which is presumed to be as real as the others.1 Be-
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1 The MW formalism is familiar to anyone who studies quantum computa-
tion. A quantum computer is an isolated system which evolves according to a
unitary quantum algorithm during a computation. A description of the state of0370-2693© 2006 Elsevier B.V.
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Open access under CC BY license.fore the anti-MW reader abandons this Letter, we note that the
discussion that follows applies also to the conventional Copen-
hagen interpretation, with measurement collapse, and may al-
low a derivation of probability in quantum mechanics from a
weaker initial assumption, known as the certainty assumption,
along the lines of Hartle [2] (see also Farhi et al. [5] and Cole-
man and Lesniewski [6]). An attractive doctrine (preferred by
one of the authors) is the minimalist view outlined by Hartle [4]
insisting that physics should be done without ill-defined words
and slogans such as “The other worlds are just as real”. Our
analysis could also be read within this post-Everett or decoher-
ent histories approach.
We focus on the Born rule in quantum mechanics, and the
extent to which it can be derived. The Born rule states that
the quantum computer during the computation involves a wavefunction with
many branches, and no collapse until the final read-out of the results. MW pro-
poses that the entire universe should be treated like a quantum computer; a
brain only perceives what appears to be a measurement collapse as it becomes
correlated with an outcome on a particular branch of the wavefunction, and de-
coheres from other branches due to vanishing overlap. Those who do not accept
MW are either asserting that: (i) quantum mechanics is incomplete or (ii) our
brains cannot be simulated by sub-components of a quantum computer, which
do split into multiple branches. In case (i), quantum computers will, perhaps at
some threshold of complexity, fail to operate as predicted. Case (ii) also denies
the possibility of conventional artificial intelligence, since quantum computers
can simulate classical Turing machines.
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the probability of λi as the outcome of a measurement on state
|ψ〉 is Pi = |〈ψi |ψ〉|2. It has been claimed by Everett, Hartle,
and others, that this rule arises as a consequence of the assump-
tion of unitary evolution, but as we discuss below, the derivation
is unsatisfactory for any system with only a finite number of de-
grees of freedom. (For recent discussions of the Born rule in
MW, see [7].)
In a recent Letter [8] we speculated that quantum gravity and
related considerations may imply that quantum state space is
itself discrete. We will review our argument in the next section.
Here we point out that one consequence of this discreteness in
state space may be the emergence of the Born rule, even in the
case when the number of degrees of freedom is finite.
The original derivation of the Born rule given by Everett [1],
Hartle [2], and others, is quite simple. Consider an ensemble of
identically prepared states
(1)Ψ = ψ ⊗ · · · ⊗ ψ =
N⊗
a=1
ψ(a),
and a sequence of outcomes S = (s1, s2, . . . , sN ) obtained from
measurements on each of the states. The probability P(S) of a
given sequence, or class of sequences, calculated using the Born
rule, is identical to the norm (magnitude) squared of the projec-
tion of Ψ onto eigenstates with the eigenvalues (s1, s2, . . . , sN ),
namely |〈s1s2 . . . sN |Ψ 〉|2. As Everett noted, it follows that an
improbable sequence corresponds to a component of Ψ (in
the eigenstate basis) with small magnitude. In the formal limit
N → ∞, components of Ψ which do not correspond to sta-
tistically typical sequences generated by the Born rule have
zero magnitude (i.e. converge to the null vector), and therefore
do not correspond to physical states. From the frequentist per-
spective on probability, then, the Born rule is a consequence of
excluding zero norm states from the Hilbert space.
To further elucidate, consider a simple example using spin
states. Let |ψ〉 = c+|+〉 + c−|−〉, and define p± = |c±|2. Then
a sequence of measurement outcomes will be of the form S =
{+ + − + · · ·}. If the sequence is generated by the Born rule,
then in the limit of large N , the fraction of (+) outcomes will be
p+ to very good approximation. Any other value for the fraction
of (+) outcomes has zero probability at infinite N . Correspond-
ingly, the magnitude squared |〈s1s2 . . . sN |Ψ 〉|2 is zero for any
state 〈s1s2 . . . sN | in which the fraction of outcomes si equal to
(+) is not p+.
This can be generalized: if 〈s1s2 . . . sN | corresponds to a
sequence S = {s1, s2, . . . , sN } which is statistically atypical ac-
cording to the Born rule, its overlap with Ψ will vanish when
N → ∞. Everett referred to these branches of the wavefunc-
tion as “maverick worlds”—observers on these branches would
not deduce the Born rule. Below, we will repeat this discussion
for those readers who prefer a more standard Copenhagen in-
terpretation to the MW interpretation.
We can define parameters characterizing the deviation of a
maverick world from the central Born value. For example, in
the spin example, we might consider f+ to be the frequency of
(+) outcomes, so that δ = f+ − p+ is the deviation parame-ter. Then any branch with non-zero δ will have vanishing norm
in the large N limit. When N is strictly infinite all maverick
worlds have zero norm. The remaining branches have outcomes
S which satisfy the Born rule in the frequentist sense.
The problem with this reasoning is of course that N is never
strictly infinite. In fact, given the finite size of the causal hori-
zon of our universe and an ultraviolet cutoff on modes (e.g.,
from the Planck scale), we obtain a finite, although very large,
upper limit on the number of outcomes N which characterize
any particular branch of the MW wavefunction. Without invok-
ing something like the Born rule—a correspondence between
probability and norm—there is no reason to exclude branches
with small but non-zero norm. The problem is exacerbated by
the fact that maverick worlds are generally far more numerous
than non-maverick worlds. The MW wavefunction branches
with each measurement, regardless of how small either of |c±|2
is. This leads to 2N total branches after N measurements. Even
if, e.g., |c+|2 is much larger than |c−|2, both (+) and (−) out-
comes will still occur at each branch, and the structure of the
tree is independent of c± as long as neither is zero. The over-
whelming majority of branches will have roughly equal num-
bers of (+) and (−) outcomes. Thus the multiplicity of mav-
erick worlds is enormously larger than non-maverick worlds,
although their collective magnitude is vanishingly small. Again,
without assuming the Born rule, we have no à priori reason to
exclude small (but non-zero) norm states.
Of course, a strict frequentist interpretation of probabil-
ity requires an infinite sequence of outcomes. However, the
use of probability by physicists is more Bayesian than fre-
quentist: confronted with a finite sequence of outcomes, S =
(s1, s2, . . . , sN ), our goal is to deduce a predictive model for
subsequent outcomes. In this way, we deduce the Born rule
based on the limited number of measurements thus far per-
formed on quantum systems.
As mentioned, our discussion may be of interest even to
those who do not accept MW, as it pertains to the origin of the
Born rule within the Copenhagen, or measurement collapse, in-
terpretation. In particular, it has been proposed by Hartle [2]
that the Born rule can be derived from the weaker certainty as-
sumption, stating that when a measurement of an observable A
is performed on an eigenstate |a〉 of A, the value a is obtained
with certainty. Taking A to be, for example, the frequency oper-
ator for (+) outcomes, or any other statistical property, Hartle
found that for N infinite, Ψ is an eigenstate of each of these
statistical operators, with eigenvalues given by the Born rule.
The discussion parallels that in the MW interpretation. In the
standard Copenhagen picture the state Ψ is, in the eigenstate
basis, a sum of 2N terms, each term being in one-to-one corre-
spondence with a MW branch or a universe. In the Copenhagen
interpretation the outcomes S result from measurements on an
ensemble, whereas in MW they specify a particular branch or
decoherent history [9] of the wavefunction of the entire uni-
verse. The mathematics is the same in either picture: maverick
terms collectively have a very small norm that approaches zero
as N approaches infinity.
This has the same weakness as the earlier MW argument.
For any finite N , the state Ψ is only approximately an eigen-
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not specify the outcome of a measurement on an approximate
eigenstate, and going further requires an assumption relating
the norm of a state vector to the probability of a measurement
outcome, which is essentially the Born rule.
2. Discrete state space
Consider normalized states Ψ = ψ ⊗ · · · ⊗ ψ and Ψ ′ =
ψ ′ ⊗ · · · ⊗ ψ ′. Suppose that, due to fundamental discreteness,
one cannot distinguish ψ and ψ ′ when |ψ − ψ ′| < . This im-
plies that the direct product states cannot be distinguished when
(assuming √N 
 1)
(2)|Ψ − Ψ ′| < √N.
(We have assumed that 〈ψ |ψ ′〉 is real, which would be the case
if ψ ′ resulted from rotating ψ slightly on the Bloch sphere. Rel-
ative phases could lead to order N terms in Eq. (2), which al-
low an acceptable cutoff of maverick branches for even smaller
discreteness scale .) Motivated by this observation, we assume
that any (maverick!) components of Ψ with norm less than√
N can be removed from the wavefunction.
We argued in Ref. [8] that quantum gravity suggests a dis-
creteness scale of order  ∼ E, where E is the characteristic
energy of the system described by ψ , in Planck units. Equiva-
lently,  ∼ L−1, where L is the characteristic size, or Compton
wavelength, of the system. We can motivate this result by not-
ing that quantum gravity seems to imply a minimal length [10]
of order the Planck length. A minimal length restricts our abil-
ity to distinguish two different orientations of an experimental
apparatus, such as a Stern–Gerlach device for measuring the
orientation of a spin. (Rotation of the device by an angle less
than L−1 does not displace any component by more than the
Planck length.) Thus, the resulting ambiguity in the spin state
even after an ideal measurement is at least of order  given
above (see Fig. 1). There is no way to ensure that the ensemble
states ψ are identical to accuracy better than . For example,
each time we pass a spin through the Stern–Gerlach device to
produce another ψ there can be no guarantee that the Stern–
Gerlach device remains in precisely the same orientation.
While some might consider fundamental discreteness of the
space of quantum states (previously referred to in the earlier
paper [8] as discrete Hilbert space2) to be a radical notion, we
find asserting its absolute continuity in the absence of any sup-
porting experimental evidence to be perhaps just as speculative.
Consider the case of spacetime: few would claim that space-
time must be absolutely continuous (in fact, most likely it is not
[10]); why should quantum state space be different?
It is worth emphasizing that the discreteness we propose has
nothing to do with the dimensionality of state space. Rather,
it has to do with whether the coefficients ci in an eigenstate
2 It has not escaped our notice that discrete Hilbert space is something of an
oxymoron, given the mathematical properties of a Hilbert space. However, the
identification of quantum state space and Hilbert space in physics has become
so strong that the two are almost interchangeable in the minds of physicists.Fig. 1. A possible discretization of the Bloch sphere (qubit state space). Points
on each disc (of size ) are identified. Points between discs can be assigned to
the nearest disc.
expansion |ψ〉 =∑i ci |i〉 are continuous or can only take on a
discrete set of values (see Fig. 1).
We have not specified the concrete realization of discrete-
ness, other than to assume that states can be defined only mod-
ulo some fundamental uncertainty. There are many ways to
define the evolution of a state in a discrete state space. One
method would be to write the time evolution operator e−iH t
as a product of discrete evolution operators e−iHt and apply
this product of operators sequentially to the state, followed by
the “snap to” rule (“snap to nearest lattice site”; see Fig. 1) after
each step. This is equivalent to taking classical digital computer
simulations literally. That is, by accepting the finite precision of
the variable ψ(x) in an ordinary computer program, one obtains
a naive discretization of Hilbert space with the “snap to” rule
implemented by simple numerical rounding. With limited nu-
merical precision, branches of the wavefunction with very small
norm are eventually discarded. This scheme leads to small vio-
lations of linear superposition, but only at the level of .
Interestingly, for  ∼ L−1, the condition that discreteness
have only a small effect on Ψ ,
√
N 
 1, leads to a condition
on the number of degrees of freedom reminiscent of hologra-
phy [11]:
(3)N 
 L2 ∼ A,
where A is the surface area of the region. This bound im-
plies far fewer degrees of freedom than the usual extensive
scaling N ∼ L3. It can be deduced as a constraint from grav-
itational collapse [12]. Excluding states from the Hilbert space
of the L3 volume which would have already caused gravita-
tional collapse to a black hole, we find the stronger condition
N < A3/4 ∼ L3/2.
3. No maverick worlds
Consider the spin example from the first section. Let n =
n+ = f+N be the number of (+) outcomes in the sequence S.
We suppress the + subscript in what follows. For N  1, the
function
(4)P(n) =
(
N
n
)
pn(1 − p)N−n
has a sharp maximum at n = pN and rapidly decreases for n
sufficiently far from it. The maximum results from a competi-
tion between the combinatorial factor (multiplicity), which is
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peaked at either n = 0 or n = N , unless p− is extremely close
to p+. It follows that when calculating P(n) for n not too far
from pN , we make a negligible error by assuming n  1 and
N − n  1. The Stirling formula gives
(5)P(fN) ≈ [2πNf (1 − f )]−1/2 exp[−Nφ(f )],
where
(6)φ(f ) = f ln(f/p) + (1 − f ) ln[(1 − f )/(1 − p)]
and f = n/N . For large N this becomes sharply peaked. Ex-
panding φ(f ) around f = p, we find
(7)P(fN) ≈ [2πNp(1 − p)]−1/2 exp
[
−N(f − p)
2
2p(1 − p)
]
.
The collective magnitude squared of all maverick states |δ,N〉
with frequency deviation |δ| = |f − p| greater than δ0 is
(8)
∑
|δ|>δ0
〈δ,N |δ,N〉 ≈ 2N
∞∫
p+δ0
df P (fN).
One contribution to the sum comes from the range f ∈ [0,p −
δ0] and the other from the range f ∈ [p + δ0,1]. Note that we
have replaced f (1−f ) in the overall factor in P(fN) by p(1−
p). The resulting error should be negligible for our purposes
here.
Requiring that this collective magnitude squared is less than
N2 yields
(9)δ0 > N−1/2
[
2p(1 − p)∣∣ln(N2)∣∣]1/2.
The maximum deviation δ for undiscarded branches vanishes as
N → ∞ for fixed p, . If, for finite N , an experimenter could
measure all N outcomes which define his branch of the wave-
function, he might find a deviation from the predicted Born
frequency f = p as large as |ln(N2)|1/2 standard deviations
(i.e., measuring the deviation in units of N−1/2). Note that we
are working in the regime N2 
 1. If the discussion in Ref. [8]
offers a valid guide, the number  may be much smaller than
10−20, so that even if N is as large as Avogadro’s number, N2
will still be a small number (see example below).
However, an experimenter is unlikely to be able to mea-
sure more than a small fraction of the outcomes that deter-
mine his branch. Recall that in MW a particular branch of
the wavefunction is specified by the sequence of outcomes
S = (s1, s2, . . . , sN ). N is the total number of decoherent out-
comes on a branch, so it is typically enormous—at least Avo-
gadro’s number if the system contains macroscopic objects such
as an experimenter. The experimental outcomes available to test
Born’s rule will be a much smaller number N∗ 
 N corre-
sponding to a subset of the si directly related to the experiment.
Any deviation from the Born rule of order N−1/2 will be well
within the experimental statistical error of order N−1/2∗ . There-
fore the Born rule will be observed to hold in all the branches
which remain after truncation due to discreteness. This would,
however, not be true if we were to set  to zero, in which case
|ln(N2)|1/2 would be infinite.For definiteness, consider the following numerical example.
Let the discreteness scale be truly tiny:  ∼ 10−100, and let
N ∼ 10160, which is the Hubble four-volume in fermis. Then
|ln(N2)|1/2 ∼ 10, so unless experimenters can measure more
than 10−2N ∼ 10158 quantum outcomes, they will have insuf-
ficient statistics to exclude any of the maverick branches which
remain after truncation.
4. Copenhagen again
If we assume the Copenhagen (collapse) interpretation, our
analysis describes when the Born rule can be supplanted by the
weaker assumption of certainty of measurement outcome when
the measured state is an eigenstate. In a discrete Hilbert space
it is natural to extend the notion of eigenstate, so that states
within the discreteness distance  of an eigenstate will also be
considered eigenstates. (More precisely, we cannot distinguish
between any two such states.) As discussed in the previous sec-
tion, for large (but finite) N , Ψ is approximately an eigenstate
of any statistical operator (such as the frequency operator, but
also higher moments) with eigenvalue equal to the Born rule
value. For example, the wavefunction is sharply peaked at the
Born rule frequency value of f = p. If, motivated by the dis-
creteness scale , we simply modify the certainty assumption to
include states which are approximate eigenstates, we will have
deduced the Born rule from a more elementary assumption.
There is, however, a technical difficulty in defining how
close a state Ψ is to being an eigenstate of an operator such
as the frequency operator. It would be natural to impose a cer-
tainty criteria as follows. Given Ψ satisfying
(10)|Ψ − Ψf | <
√
N,
where Ψf is an eigenstate of the frequency operator with eigen-
value f , we identify Ψ with Ψf and require that a measure-
ment of the frequency on Ψ return the value f with certainty.
The problem arises because, for finite N , no choice of Ψ =⊗N
a=1 ψ(a) is an exact eigenstate of the frequency operator (ex-
cept in the trivial cases where ψ is already an eigenstate such
as |+〉 or |−〉, and in those cases f is either zero or one). The
state Ψf does not exist, except in the limit N → ∞, so the dis-
tance criteria in Eq. (10) cannot be defined. (Ψ and Ψf live in
Hilbert spaces of very different dimensions.) One has to rely
on some other criterion for identifying a state Ψ as a frequency
eigenstate.
One possibility is to use the width of |Ψ |2 about the max-
imum, in comparison to some -dependent quantity. When
the width is sufficiently small, the certainty assumption is as-
sumed to apply. Consider a self-adjoint operator A, its eigen-
vectors ψi and eigenvalues λi , Aψi = λiψi , 〈ψi |ψj 〉 = δij
(i, j = 1, . . . , n). (For the qubit case A is the spin operator
and n = 2.) For a state ψ = ∑ni=1 ciψi , projection operators
Pi satisfy Piψ = ciψi . This gives 〈ψ |Pi |ψ〉 = |ci |2 = pi and∑n
i=1 pi = 1. Let us consider the state of N copies of ψ ,
Ψ =⊗Na=1 ψ(a). The frequency operators for the eigenvalues
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(11)Fi = N−1
n∑
j1,...,jN=1
N∑
a=1
δija
N⊗
b=1
Pjb .
We find
(12)〈Ψ |Fi |Ψ 〉 = pi,
(13)〈Ψ |F 2i |Ψ 〉 = N−1pi + N−1(N − 1)p2i ,
and the variances are (Fi)2 = N−1pi(1 − pi).
Consider ψ ′ =∑ni=1 c′iψi close to ψ , and require
(14)(pi − p′i )2 < min
{
(Fi)
2, (F ′i )2
}
.
This gives
(15)|ci − c′i |2 < N−1(1 − pi),
which leads to
(16)|ψ − ψ ′|2 < N−1(n − 1).
This condition is satisfied if we require |ψ −ψ ′|2 
 2, recall-
ing that N2 < 1. It is natural to identify the two states ψ and
ψ ′, and consider them both approximate eigenstates of the fre-
quency operator.
5. Conclusions
We argued that attempts to derive the Born rule, either in the
Many Worlds or Copenhagen interpretation, are unsatisfactory
for systems with only a finite number of degrees of freedom.
For Many Worlds this is a serious problem, since its goal is to
account for apparent collapse phenomena—including the Born
rule for probabilities—assuming only unitary evolution of the
wavefunction. For finite number of degrees of freedom, ob-
servers on the vast majority of branches would not deduce the
Born rule.
However, we noted that discreteness of the quantum state
space, even if extremely tiny, may restore the validity of theusual arguments. Some may regard discreteness as a radical
proposal. We might argue that it is actually less speculative than
absolute continuity, something that can never be experimentally
verified.
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